EXHIBIT B

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                     WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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                                         ) 99-CR-6084
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                           99-CR-6089
4
    vs.
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    DENNIS FORBES,
                                         ) 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1)
6
                                         ) 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(a)
                 Defendant.
                                           846; 861(a)(1)
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                       Transcript of Proceeding
                             (Sentencing)
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              Before the Honorable Charles J. Siragusa
                     United States District Judge
10
                                Tuesday
11
                            15 January 2002
                          Rochester, New York
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PROCEEDINGS

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THE COURT: For the record, this is the matter of

United States versus Dennis Forbes.

You are Dennis Forbes?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Mr. Forbes, you're appearing with your attorney, Mr. Okay; is that correct?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

MR. OKAY: Good afternoon, your Honor.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

The Court notes the presence of Mr. Sherman on behalf of the government.

Mr. Forbes, this matter is on for sentencing. In that regard I have received and reviewed the Presentence Investigation Report prepared by the United States

Department of Probation, initially on July 24th, 2001, and then revised on November 30th, 2001, and finally on December 21st, 2001.

I've also read carefully Mr. Okay's objections to the presentence report dated December 27th, 2001, and the government's statement with respect to sentencing factors, and a response to your objections to the PSR, which was dated January 9th, 2002.

Mr. Sherman, have you received and reviewed the

Presentence Investigation Report? 1 MR. SHERMAN: Yes, your Honor. 2 THE COURT: Mr. Okay, have you received and reviewed 3 it as well? 4 MR. OKAY: Yes, your Honor. 5 THE COURT: Have you had occasion to go over the 6 presentence report with Mr. Forbes? 7 MR. OKAY: Yes, I have. On several occasions we 8 have gone over it in detail, your Honor. 9 THE COURT: Mr. Forbes, have you read the report 10 yourself? 11 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 12 THE COURT: I do note that you have made five 13 objections to the Presentence Investigation Report. Before 14 proceeding any further I will address them in the order they 15 were listed in your objections to the Presentence 16 Investigation Report. 17 At the outset the Court does note in resolving these 18 objections it is, of course, well settled to rule against 19 the defendant the government must generally establish the 20 disputed allegations in the presentence report by a 21 preponderance of the evidence, United States versus Lee, 22 818 F.2d 1052 at page 1057, a 1987 Second Circuit case, 23 cert. denied 484 U.S. 956, a 1987 case. 24

Further, it has long been established that hearsay

evidence is admissible at a sentencing hearing,

<u>United States versus Weinberg</u>, 852 F.2d 681 at 685, a 1988

Second Circuit case.

More specifically, the Court may, in reaching its decision, rely on hearsay statements contained in a Presentence Investigation Report as well as other hearsay, as long as such hearsay has adequate indicia of reliability; United States versus Carmona, 863 F.2d 569, at 564, a 1989 Second Circuit case.

First, Mr. Forbes, you object to paragraph 26 of the Presentence Investigation Report which characterized Brett Harrington as a victim in what is called the overall conduct of the offense. You list several reasons: Because this was not a homicide; no homicide issue of fact is presented in the evidence or to the jury; that there is no mention of the death of Brett Harrington in the PSR; and while the senior probation officer refers to Brett Harrington as a victim in the overall conduct of the offense, Winston Banner, who has been accused of another homicide and who was the alleged victim in Count 3 of the superseding indictment, is nowhere in the PSR described as a victim of Dennis Forbes.

As to this objection, the Court determines that pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(1), no finding is necessary because the controverted matter will not be taken into account in, or will not affect, your

sentencing in any way.

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Turning to your next objection, you object to paragraph 30 of the Presentence Investigation Report, which calculates your base offense level at 38 and lists a number of reasons, which I will go through now.

First, you contend the facts indicate the jury verdict form detailed, as to Count 1 of the second superseding indictment, that you were linked to more than 50 grams of cocaine base.

Next, you say that the senior probation officer alleges in conclusory fashion, based upon the flawed analysis of the statements of Kevin Pierre and Winston Banner, which were not part of the evidence before the trial jury, that Dennis Forbes can be linked to the possession and movement of 1.5 kilograms or more of cocaine base in this District.

Next, you indicate the senior probation officer's methodology is improper because it presupposes that on every single day during the period described in the indictment the same quantity of drugs were sold, and such a 100-percent efficiency rating is improbable in the realm of reality.

Next, you indicate no evidence of the movement of kilogram quantities of cocaine base by Dennis Forbes was presented to the trial jury, and there is absolutely nothing in the jury form to indicate other than a link to more than

50 grams of cocaine base.

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Next, you say the Supreme Court recent opinion in Apprendi versus New Jersey, and versus United States, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 2000, holds that any fact that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in the indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Next, you argue the conclusions of the senior probation officer in paragraph 30 are not conclusions of the trial jury based upon the evidence at trial, and it is the position of the defense that the base offense level should be 32.

The Court disagrees with your position, Mr. Forbes, and agrees with the presentence report and finds by a preponderance of evidence that, pursuant to United States Sentencing Guidelines Section 2D1.1(c)(1), a base level of 38 is appropriate.

In that regard, the Court specifically credits as reliable Kevin Pierre's statements to the police that he sold at least \$500 worth of cocaine base a day for you for two years. The Court further finds that based upon the experience of law enforcement officials cocaine is generally sold in \$10 bags weighing approximately one gram each; therefore, Pierre sold 3.5 kilograms, or 3,500 grams during the period encompassed in the Count 1 conspiracy for which

you stand convicted.

MR. SHERMAN: Your Honor, I'm sorry. I think you said "one gram each," and I think the finding in the PSR was one-tenth of a gram --

THE COURT: I thought I said one-tenth of a gram.

The Court's notes do indicate one-tenth of a gram each.

Therefore, Pierre sold about 1.5 kilograms, or 3,500 grams, in the period encompassed in Count 1 in the conspiracy, for which, Mr. Forbes, you stand convicted. This is obviously more than the 1.5 kilogram minimum required for a base level of 38.

Moreover, the Court finds, specifically based upon the trial testimony, that the conduct of Pierre was certainly within the scope of the conspiracy for which you were convicted. Additionally, the Court finds that you were the leader/organizer of the Count 1 conspiracy; and therefore, Pierre's conduct was foreseeable to you. See United States versus Hernandez-Santiago, 92 F.3d 97, page 1000, a 1996 Second Circuit case.

The Court makes all its findings by a preponderance of evidence.

Your reliance on <u>Apprendi</u> is misplaced since your statutory maximum of life is not being increased by the Court's sentencing determination as to drug quantity.

Rather, the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that you

conspired to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base, which establishes the maximum sentence at life. Therefore, the preponderance of evidence standard properly applies to the Court's determination of a base level of 38.

Third, you object to the upward adjustment in paragraph 31 for specific offender characteristics pursuant to United States Sentencing Guideline 2D1.1(b)(1), which you indicate such section is nowhere to be found in the guideline.

You claim the facts indicate the conspiracy was alleged to have existed in this District between July of 1998 and July of 1999.

You say the facts indicate that Dennis Forbes was found to be in possession of a firearm at the time of the automobile stop on August 11th, 1999, after the conspiracy had ended.

You argue the defense notes that there is no proof that Dennis Forbes was found to be in possession of a firearm at the time of the automobile stop on August 11th, 1999, after the conspiracy had ended.

You say the trial jury was unable to reach a verdict as to Count 2; and therefore, the two-level enhancement cannot be applied to increase the maximum penalty, citing Apprendi.

You argue the defense notes, en passant, that the senior probation officer on page 5, paragraph 9, makes reference to indictment 99-CR-6084 and alleges that Dennis Forbes possessed a handgun as a felon on September 9th, 1999, when in fact the automobile stop which gave rise to the charges occurred on August 11th, 1999.

Finally, you argue that the felon in possession conviction by plea cannot be used to support the two-level enhancement because the date of August 11th, 1999, falls outside the time frame of the charged conspiracy.

However, the Court finds by a preponderance of evidence that the enhancement applies.

At the outset, the Court notes despite the failure of the jury to a verdict on Count 2 of the second superseding indictment, the <u>Apprendi</u> rule will not be implemented in the Court's finding as to possession of a dangerous weapon since this finding will not result in a sentence on a single count above the statutory maximum for that count; <u>United States versus Breen</u>, 243 F.3d 591 at page 598 through 599. <u>Breen</u> is a 2001 Second Circuit case.

In this regard, the Court bases its determination of the appropriateness of the two-level increase upon the evidence that was presented at trial, including your own statements, as well as other reliable hearsay before the Court.

For example, you admitted in your statements given on August 11th, 1999, that you had been in possession of a gun during the period of the conspiracy. In addition, weapons were twice found by the police at 82 Eddy Street, one of the drug houses that you ran during the time of the conspiracy.

On one occasion, July of 1998, police found a shotgun there while investigating an illegal cable television connection matter. The second time was on September 29th of 1998 when the police arrested co-defendant Damon Shallow at that location; they found in the residence a .22 caliber long rifle as well as a loaded .22 caliber semi-automatic pistol and a .22 caliber revolver that was loaded.

At sentencing in this matter Shallow did acknowledge that he was selling drugs for you out of 82 Eddy Street at the time of his arrest, and did so indicate under oath.

So as indicated, the Court finds by a preponderance of evidence that the enhancement applies.

Fourth, you object to paragraph 33 of the Presentence Investigation Report because the senior probation officer's unsupported conclusions, once again, accuse Dennis Forbes of being an organizer of more than five.

The reasons you list are Dennis Forbes is accused

along with two others; Winston Banner does not say anything about working for Dennis Forbes between July of 1998 and July of 1999; Kevin Pierre said that he hustled for Dennis Forbes and that a kid named Bugs worked at York, too; assuming that Bugs is Winston Banner, that a paucity of evidence that Dennis Forbes was the an organizer of more than five.

The senior probation officer mentions Damon Shallow, Kevin Pierre, Winston Banner, Terrance Melford, and Jamal McGregor as all working for Dennis Forbes. That is five people. Not more than five people is required by the statute.

There's no evidence in the trial record to support the senior probation officer's contention that Dennis Forbes was an organizer as opposed to a manager as defined in the guidelines; and finally, you say, accordingly the Court is inclined to conclude that Dennis Forbes was an organizer and manager, then the two-point enhancement should be utilized.

Again, the Court disagrees with your position and finds by a preponderance of evidence introduced at trial that you, pursuant to Guidelines Section 3B1.1(a), were an organizer or leader of criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive.

The Court finds based upon the proof at trial by a preponderance of evidence, that you were the organizer of

the drug conspiracy or leader for which you were convicted and that it involved at least you, Winston Banner, Kevin Pierre, Terrance Melford, Jamal McGregor, and Damon Shallow.

Finally, you object to paragraph 48 of the presentence report stating that you obstructed justice simply because you moved to withdraw your guilty plea under indictment 99-CR-6084.

I should note this ruling is not going to impact on anything since it relates to the possession of a weapon by a felon, and as the presentence report accurately states, the guideline determination on the conviction on the first indictment controls. The Court will nonetheless rule on it.

Your specific objection goes to the following: The senior probation officer states, "The defendant pled guilty under oath and later under oath presented information to the Court in order to withdraw his guilty plea. That means on one of these occasions he lied to the Court and committed perjury."

You indicated one of the primary issues in a guilty plea is whether the plea is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.

One of the primary issues of perjury is always materiality.

You go on to say the senior probation officer does not mention materiality in paragraph 48 or whether any of

the lies supposedly told to the Court in any way related to any of the elements of the felon-in-possession charge.

And finally, for the foregoing reason the two-level enhancement should not be applied.

Despite the defense contentions, the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the enhancement applies.

Section 3C1.1 provides for this enhancement where a defendant willfully obstructs or impedes or attempts to obstruct or impede the administration of justice during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction. This Circuit in <u>United States versus Ben-Shimon</u>, 249 F.3d 98, page 102 to 103, a 2001 Second Circuit case, relying on the United States Supreme Court decision in <u>United States versus Dunnigan</u>, 507 U.S. 87 at page 95, a 1993 Supreme Court case, held that if a defendant objects to a sentence enhancement for perjury, a district court must review the evidence and make independent findings necessary to establish a willful impediment to or obstruction of justice or an attempt to do the same under the perjury definition set out in <u>Dunnigan</u>.

The definition relates to the federal perjury statute and is as follows: "A witness testifying under oath or affirmation violates the federal criminal perjury statute if he or she gives false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony,

rather as a result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory."

Moreover, the Circuit in <u>Ben-Shimon</u>, advised that in determining whether an enhancement for obstruction of justice is required, it is sufficient if the district court makes a finding of an obstruction of, or the impediment to, justice that encompasses all of the factual predicates for a finding of perjury, but that it is preferable for a District Court to address each element of the alleged perjury in separate and finding.

Therefore, in this Circuit, as <u>Ben-Shimon</u> makes clear, enhancement for obstruction of justice based on perjury may be imposed only where the sentencing court finds that the defendant willfully and materially committed perjury, which is the intentional giving of false testimony as to a material matter; <u>United States versus Zagari</u>, 111 F.3d, 307 at 329, a 1997 Second Circuit case.

That is to say, perjury is committed "willfully" where it is made for the specific purpose of obstructing justice, and "materially" where it is material to the proceeding in which it is given.

Moreover, it is well settle that obstruction of justice findings relating to perjury must be made by clear and convincing evidence, <u>United States v. Kelley</u>, 142 F.3d, 172 at 178, a 1998 Second Circuit case.

Applying these principles of law to this case, the

Court does find by clear and convincing evidence that you perjured yourself, and that the two-point upward adjustment applies.

In reaching its decision the Court relies on the following: The plea allocution on January 24th, 2001, in which you told me that you wanted to plead guilty. You were placed under oath at that time. You acknowledged that you had discussed pleading guilty with your then lawyer, Mr. Schiano. You indicated to me that you believed it was in your best interest to plea guilty to the charge. You stated that you had enough time to consult with your lawyer and that you were satisfied with Mr. Schiano's advice and representation. You said that your decision to plead guilty was based in part upon the government's representation that it would dismiss the charge upon which the jury hung at trial; that is, the possession of a weapon in furtherance of drug trafficking.

You told me that you didn't have any questions, and you indicated to me that you answered my questions truthfully. I further asked you, and you acknowledged, that you were not threatened and that other than the promises discussed no promises had been made to you to plead guilty; that is, other than the indication that the government would dismiss the charge upon which the jury was hung.

The process of ultimately withdrawing your plea was

a long one. I advised you repeatedly of the down side of withdrawing your plea. I advised you if you submitted a statement to me which contradicted the testimony that you gave under oath, that it could result in an enhancement for obstruction of justice.

I discussed with you the wisdom of proceeding. I assigned you new counsel who told you the same thing; and ultimately when you persisted I cautioned you that a lawyer could not ethically bring your motion if he thought there was no good-faith basis to do so. That, of course, resulted in my relieving the lawyer who I appointed, Mr. Wicks, and allowing you to proceed pro se to bring the motion.

However, this record is replete with warnings given to you by the Court that you would be subjecting yourself to this potential enhancement if you persisted and submitted a statement contrary to your sworn testimony when you pled quilty.

So the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that you willfully committed perjury when you indicated to the Court that your plea was essentially coerced by Mr. Schiano. You did it with a specific purpose of obstructing justice; that is, it was certainly material to the proceeding, and it was clearly intentional on your part.

As I said, you were questioned very carefully, and to the extent that you now allege that the plea was coerced,

that you didn't know what you were doing, that it wasn't voluntarily, that makes the sworn testimony that you gave at your allocution perjurious. The Court finds that by clear and convincing evidence; and therefore, this enhancement is appropriate based upon the Court's determination that -- at least according to your latest statement -- it means you perjured yourself when you took the plea under oath at the time you were represented by Mr. Schiano.

However, as I indicated in the last analysis, it's not going to make any difference.

I do note, however, that you filed your motion -finally filed it -- on September 26th, 2001, and you claimed
in your papers that you entered into a plea which was
neither knowing, intelligent, nor voluntarily which resulted
from confusion about what you were plead guilty, due to your
lawyer advising you that you would be pleading guilty to
Count 2 of Indictment 99-CR-6089 and not to Indictment
99-CR-6084, which makes absolutely no sense because then you
would be pleading guilty to the possession-in-furtherance
crime, which the jury hung on, which would mean you would
have to get a minimum of -- I think in your case -- 10 more
years in jail. It makes no sense.

As I said, your withdrawal affidavit directly contradicts what you said under oath at your plea and also contradicts -- strike that, your withdrawal plea contradicts

what you said to this Court under oath; so accepting this contradiction, it means that clearly at some point you're not being truthful to this Court.

I did make specific findings when I declined to withdraw the motion, that they were inherently incredible.

I mean, you told me -- I'm trying to recollect, but because of the contradictory nature of the statements you did indicate to me that you didn't tell the truth when you entered your guilty plea. I think that was your statement to me in the court as I recall. So there can be little question in the Court's mind that this enhancement applies.

However, as I repeat for the third time, it really doesn't make any difference since it's not going to impact in any way on your sentencing.

Mr. Sherman, does the government move for sentence?
MR. SHERMAN: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you have anything to say?

MR. SHERMAN: Only, your Honor, that obviously the guideline calculation you just affirmed subjects Mr. Forbes to the ultimate sentence that this Court can give, which is life imprisonment; and to the extent anybody viewing this record would think that sentence was somehow inappropriate, I just want the record to reflect, as the Court is well aware, through a number of different indictments that have been before this Court it's been established that Mr. Forbes

was not only the organizer of the five other people that the Court mentioned, but interacted with at least 10 or 15 other people who have been before this Court either in the status of a defendant or a witness.

It's also clear from his conviction on Count 3 that Mr. Forbes had a very negative impact on a number of young people, including Winston Banner. The evidence has been clear through all these prosecutions that Mr. Forbes was responsible for recruiting teenagers to come up to Rochester from New York City to sell drugs; and certainly, to that extent he's responsible for not only ruining those people's lives in terms of subjecting them to prosecution, but ultimately that in the course of the time period of this conspiracy we are aware that at least two people have been hurt.

It's entirely appropriate in the government's view that in light of the fact that Mr. Forbes has never accepted responsibility for any of his actions he does in fact receive a life sentence.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Sherman.

Mr. Okay, do you wish to say anything on behalf of Mr. Forbes before the Court passes sentence?

MR. OKAY: Your Honor, I would just point out, as my colleague for the government has indicated, Mr. Forbes, based on the finding that this Court has made and the

findings that the Court made at the time of the denial of the application to withdraw his guilty plea, he faces the ultimate sentence under the guidelines, life imprisonment. He's at level 45 in the criminal history category of III. There's not much room to maneuver there.

Your Honor, I didn't try this case and I wasn't present at the time of the guilty plea or the time that the application to withdraw was before the Court, so I don't really have much to say. I haven't even seen the trial transcript.

I was having a conversation before you came out here with Mr. Lyons, and I was talking to him about the sentencing guidelines; and I always go back in these federal cases, in a case under guidelines, I always go back to the language of the commission. One thing that strikes me now, as I recall, is the commission's view that each defendant who comes before the Court for sentencing presents a unique study in the human failings that either mitigate nor magnify the crime and punishment to ensue.

I know the Court can appreciate that, but, your Honor, my hands are tied. The Court has made its findings. We are bound to respect those findings. We are at level 45 with a criminal history category of III. I don't know what else to say. We made our objections. The Court has made his findings.

I do know Mr. Forbes would like to make a statement to the Court, if the Court will permit it.

THE COURT: Certainly. First of all, though, I want to thank you, Mr. Okay, for taking the assignment, and I know you'll be handling the appeal; and thank you for the fine job you've done in the representation of Mr. Forbes at the time of sentencing. The Court certainly recognizes the time and effort you put into the case so far and appreciates what I know will be the continued effort you will put in for Mr. Forbes' appeal. I just wanted to take the time to give you the Court's appreciation for what you've done.

Mr. Forbes, the law does permit you to make a statement to me before I pass sentence, so go ahead.

THE DEFENDANT: I'm about to read. It might take some time, so...

THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Forbes.

THE DEFENDANT: December 22nd, 1998, Dennis Forbes was in the hospital with a bullet wound that went through his hip and lodged in the waist. Officer Tom Janus said that Dennis Forbes made a statement admitting a homicide. Dennis Forbes retained lawyer Tom Cuzzi and told him what took place with him and the Officer while he was in Intensive Care unit. Tom Cuzzi told Dennis Forbes that the Officer violated his rights by asking him questions when you're in that kind of condition.

Dennis Forbes' lawyer got on the phone and called

Tom Janus and told him that he was Dennis Forbes' lawyer and

not to have any contact with his client unless he's notified

in advance.

During the same time, Tom Janus notified INS that Dennis Forbes was shot and that he was in the hospital, and the INS did nothing.

On July 11, 1999, Curtis Crawley was shot and killed. His cousin made two statements to Tom Janus. One is that he did not recognize who shot his cousin. Two days later Tom Janus again questioned the witness who then changed his mind and told Janus that he recognized who it was.

On August 2nd, 1999, Dennis Forbes' home was under police surveillance. Dennis Forbes pulled in the parking lot and parked and him and Conroy Porchman stepped out of the car and went to Dennis Forbes' house in Grecian Gardens, Greece, New York. They stayed in the house until Dennis Forbes took a shower and changed.

When they left there, RPD followed their car. After following for a few miles they were pulled over by Rochester Police Department officers. They were ordered out of the car at gunpoint. The first person to exit the vehicle was the passenger, Conroy Porchman. Dennis Forbes, who was the driver, was also ordered to step out of the vehicle while

looking into the muzzle of a shotgun. The officer yelled,
"Keep your hands up and use one hand to open the door. Get
out and lay on the ground." While being on the ground
Dennis Forbes was searched and a gun was found on his person
in his left front pocket.

Dennis Forbes was taken to the interrogation room and handcuffed to the table. Dennis Forbes asked if he could make a call to speak to his lawyer, Tom Cuzzi. The officer said no and left the room.

Dennis Forbes fell asleep for a few moments and was awakened by an officer who was typewriting while Officer Janus is asking questions about Conroy Porchman and Kevin Pierre. Officer Janus told Dennis Forbes that there was a shoot-out between Curtis Crawley and Conroy Porchman on July 4th. Where were you. Dennis Forbes told the Officer he was in New York City to Christmas with a newborn daughter.

Dennis Forbes told the Officer he heard about it because a lady told him about it, and he have a videotape to prove where he was that day.

The Officer then said you hear -- the Officer then said did you hear that Curtis was killed the other day? Did you hear about it? Dennis Forbes says yes. The Officer said how did you know? A friend in the neighborhood told me, plus it was on the news.

Janus said people said they seen your car in the

neighborhood with Kevin and Conroy the day he was killed.

Dennis Forbes told the Officer he gave them a ride to the store the other day. They -- meaning Kevin and Conroy -- was walking on Silver and Eddy Street. That stopped Dennis Forbes' car and asked if he could give them a ride to the store to buy beer and blunt. He dropped them at the store and bought a beer for himself, left them at the store and went to his brother's store at "Shylock". He was there for about 20 minutes and left.

The Officer asked where did you drive -- where did you drive? The officer asked where did you drive? Dennis Forbes said "Shylock" and turned down Appleton. Dennis Forbes saw Kevin and Conroy walking down Appleton Street. They asked Dennis Forbes to give them a ride. The Officer asked where did you drop them off. I told them Eddy and Silver Street. The Officer asked what were they wearing? Dennis Forbes told the officers what they were wearing. They asked -- the Officer asked did they look nervous. I said no.

"Did you see a bulge?"

I said no.

"Were they speeding?" I said no.

"Did you see a qun?" I said no.

"Did they tell you they shot someone?" Dennis

Forbes looked at the Officer and said, "If you shot someone

would you tell anyone?"

Then he -- then the Officer got upset and said, "Just tell us that Kevin and Conroy killed Curtis and we will forget about the gun you got arrested with." Dennis Forbes told the Officer he was not there and he did not know. They insisted that I tell them.

Then finally Officer Janus said, "You don't want to work with us. You don't want to work with us. You will f'ing see." He exited the room and two other men entered the room and introduced themselves. "We are Immigration Officers Garcia and Waugaman, but sign this paper so you know who we are."

Dennis Forbes signed. They said tell the officers what they want to know and you wouldn't have to worry about us. Dennis Forbes responded, "I'm not going to lie on people because I was not there."

Then they said, "Tell us what happened when you were stopped in your car." I did. They exited the room. Dennis Forbes looked out the window. It was dark outside. The door opened. Dennis Forbes was escorted to a phone. He tried to call his lawyer, but there was no answer. He then called his wife and asked her the time. She said it was after 7 p.m.

Then he told his wife he was arrested. She said "When?" I said, "After I left the house." She said she

went to the store, and when she entered the house the door was off the hinges and the police were in the house. Dennis Forbes hangs up the phone and was taken by INS to Batavia.

In September of '99 I was indicted on conspiracy charges along with Kevin Pierre and Conroy Porchman. The indictment was superseded along with Dennis Forbes, Kevin Pierre and Damon Shallow. The case agent was Tom Janus. Tom Brennan was a narcotics investigator.

At the suppression hearing Officer Janus testified that the stop of my vehicle and the search of my person was justified because I was with Conroy Porchman who they wanted to question about a homicide. Nothing indicated that I knew anything about what Conroy Porchman knew, what I was asked about. Also, at the time there was no warrant mentioned about Dennis Forbes for him at the stop. The Officers justified the search of my person by saying they have to secure themselves.

The crime that Mr. Pierre was later convicted on happened one month, which is 7/8/99, prior to the stop of August 11th, 1999.

After not being arraigned until two months on the arrested charges the officer testified that I had an INS warrant. At the suppression hearing Agent Garcia testified that he received a phone call from Officer Tom Janus if he could come and talk to Dennis Forbes. Nothing was mentioned

about an INS warrant. There was no indication during the conversation of the mention of an INS warrant now dated August 9th of 1999, but on August 11th, 1999, when I was arrested, there was no INS officer present when I was stopped and taken out of my vehicle.

Agents Garcia's purpose was to come and talk to me about cooperating with the police officers, so there should have been no intervening period between my arraignment and arrest.

On October 5th, 2001, the Judge, U.S. Attorney, and -- and the U.S. Attorney turned down my motion to withdraw my plea. One of the reasons for denial of withdrawal of plea was due to the fact that since I had an INS charge they were justified in not arraigning me within a normal 72-hour period, even though my arraignment was not until two months after I was initially arrested on August 11th, 1999.

Under INS regulation directive of August 7th, 1969, only designated INS officers are authorized to make an arrest and the list of designated immigration officers is set forth in 8 CSR, Section 2875(c)(1)-(5), and the arrest can be made only when immigration officers have reason to believe that the person to be arrested has committed an offense going against the United States or is an alien who is in the United States illegally. Whenever possible a

warrant must be obtained prior to the arrest.

At the time of the arrest the designated immigration officer must, as soon as practicable and safe to do so, identify himself or herself as an immigration officer authorized to execute a warrant and state that the person is under arrest and the reason for the arrest.

with respect to an alien arrest and administrative charge of being in the United States in violation of the law, the arresting officer must adhere to the procedure set forth in 8 CFR, Section 273. If the arrest is made without a warrant and the procedure set forth, Section 242(c)(2) -- 8 CFR. If the arrest is made with a warrant, with respect to a person arrested and charged in violation of the law of the United States, the arresting officer must advise the person of the appropriate rights as required by law.

At the time of the arrest or as soon thereafter as practicable it is the duty of the immigration officer to ensure the warning is given in a language the arrestee understands and that the arrestee acknowledges that the warnings are understood. The fact a person has been advised of his or her rights must be identified on the arrest form and made part of the arrest.

THE COURT: Mr. Forbes, I want to let you say whatever you want to say, but we're not going on with you reading a statute to me. If there's something you want to

say about sentencing I want to give you every opportunity, and throughout the proceeding I've tried to be patient with you. As I've told you on previous occasions, I've spent more time with you than any other defendant.

I don't know what you're reading from, but you're not here to read the law. If you want to say something to me pertinent to your sentencing, go ahead.

In fact, I'll even let you continue if you're going to wrap it up.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I'm going to wrap it up.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

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THE DEFENDANT: I was detained illegally and my due process rights violated by INS Officers Garcia and Waugaman. Upon my arrest RPD took me into custody. RPD never arraigned me and took me and turned me over to INS who put me the custody of you. The marshals never took me to be arraigned during the time I was arrested. At the time of my interview with Garcia and Waugaman, the only thing said to me by the agents were, "We are INS agents. Please sign these papers so you know who we are." There was no mention of INS warrant. All they asked is what happened when I got stopped in my car and tell the police what they want to hear and you don't have to worry about us.

I never signed a statement they claim I signed. Those are not my signatures. I am willing to take a

polygraph test to prove my innocence if necessary or evidentiary hearing.

And last but not least, my entire INS file was issued and presented improperly. When Dennis Forbes was arrested there was no mention of an INS warrant and no warrant was given to me. Under Section 7.4 of the immigration law an order of arrest must be accompanied with the order to show cause required to be served and filed with the immigration court.

This clearly shows that -- this clearly shows that the police officers and INS were acting in concert, by acting in concert to charge me for the crime I'm convicted on now, which is conspiracy.

During the trial, your Honor, before Mr. Melford took the stand, my mother, who was outside because she was a witness -- well, my mother -- before Mr. Melford took the stand my mother, who was seated outside the courtroom, saw John Brennan grab Mr. Melford by the neck, and she said she heard Mr. John Brennan tell Mr. Melford he better do what he's told; and I would like to make that statement for the record.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Forbes.

The Court is prepared to pass sentence on you, Mr. Forbes. Before the Court does, however, I'm going to reverse myself on one issue, although it's academic, and

that is the enhancement the Court found for perjury. l I had occasion to review the statement from 2 September 26th, 2001, and it's not sworn to. 3 MR. SHERMAN: It's notarized. 4 THE COURT: I don't know if that makes a sworn 5 6 statement. MR. SHERMAN: I think --7 THE COURT: It doesn't bear -- all it is, is 8 notarized, which means the notary is acknowledging the 9 defendant's signature. 10 MR. SHERMAN: Your Honor, apart from that, with 11 regard to the -- two things. With regard to the obstruction 12 enhancement, apart from perjury, making false statements to 13 the Court is also a grounds under 3C1.1 to give someone the 14 enhancement, apart from whether it's perjury or not. 15 THE COURT: Direct my attention to that section, Mr. 16 Sherman, because I do note --17 MR. SHERMAN: I mean the commentary --18 THE COURT: Direct my attention to it, because I do 19 note that the Court was operating under the mistaken 20 impression that the statement that Mr. Forbes submitted was 21 an affidavit; and frankly, it is not sworn to. It bears a 22 signature of a notary public, which just means that Mr. 23 Forbes did sign the statement. So direct my attention to 24

the section you're talking about.

MR. SHERMAN: This is in the application of 4F, your Honor, providing materially false information to a judge or magistrate, whether or not it's sworn, is a grounds for the enhancement.

Not only are the matters that we've already discussed within the scope of that provision, but I would submit that Mr. Forbes just a moment ago provided this Court with materially false information, because unless I misheard him he just stated that the signatures that are found on Government Exhibit's 3 and 3A from the trial, which I have in front of me, do not bear his signature; and there's certainly a basis -- and I think there was testimony about it at the trial; but certainly the Court can find right now that, that statement was false.

(There was a pause in the proceeding.)

THE COURT: The Court is not going to find for an enhancement. You may be right, Mr. Sherman. The Court, I might add, is proceeding under -- at least in the government's submission you refer to an affidavit given by the defendant.

The Court is not going to apply the enhancement.

It's academic. It doesn't matter; and to the extent it eliminates, even arguably, an appeal issue, the Court determines it's the wiser course.

There would never be an enhancement for perjury

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where the clear and convincing standard applies because any time the defendant purportedly submitted a false statement the Court could, instead of proceeding under the clear and convincing standard, could say that the defendant was providing false information to the Court so the preponderance of evidence standard applies.

You may well be right; however, the Court is not sure at this point. Since it is academic and makes no difference, the Court is going to reverse itself on this point; and the reason I am, so the record is clear, is the Court was operating under the belief that Mr. Forbes did submit a sworn statement controverting one, which the Court believes was the truthful rendition, that he gave during his plea colloquy.

However, a closer examination of what Mr. Forbes submitted indicates merely that he signed it, and underneath it, it bears a signature by a notary public. There's no language "sworn to." So the Court, to that extent, is reversing itself.

Other than that, the Court's rulings stands.

The Court is prepared to pass sentence on you. In that regard, Mr. Forbes, I have had the opportunity to review the revised Presentence Investigation Report prepared by the United States Department of Probation, along with other submissions to which I've already referred. I've

listened carefully to what Mr. Sherman said on behalf of the government, to what Mr. Okay said on your behalf, and to what you said yourself.

You stand before me, Mr. Forbes, I believe you are now 34 years old, convicted on November 17th, 2000, after a jury trial with respect to indictment 99-CR-6089, of Count 1 of the subject indictment; that is, the Class A felony of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute marijuana and 50 grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of the Title 21 of United States Code, Section 841(b)(1)(A) and Section 846; as well as Count 3, the Class A felony of use of a minor to distribute marijuana and cocaine base, in violation of the 21 United States Code Section 861(a)(1).

Additionally, on January 24, 2001, you appeared before me and plead guilty to the 99-CR-6084, charging you with unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C., Section 922(g)(1). You did that without the benefit of a plea agreement.

As the record speaks very clearly, you attempted to withdraw that plea; however, the Court found, based on a very clear allocution, that the motion to withdraw your plea was properly denied.

It appears from an examination of your record, Mr. Forbes, that you have four prior criminal convictions. On

September 2nd, 1987, you pled guilty to attempted criminal sale of a control substance in a third degree, which is a Class C felony under New York law, and received what is referred to as shock probation; that is, a period of incarceration with five years probation to run concurrently.

Then on August 7th of 1990 you pled guilty in Rochester City Court to a Class A misdemeanor of resisting arrest and were sentenced to six days in jail.

THE DEFENDANT: Excuse me, your Honor. I wasn't sentenced to jail. I was just given community service.

THE COURT: I may have misread the presentence report; and the last thing I want, Mr. Forbes, is to make a misstatement.

The presentence report does reflect the fact that you got six days in jail, but to the extent that you're making an objection to that, I'll allow you to make the objection; and the Court will indicate to you whether you got six days or not is irrelevant, and to the extent that you object to that the Court will not take that into consideration in sentencing. However, it is clear that you did plead guilty to resisting arrest.

MR. SHERMAN: Your Honor, since we're now on this, before you pronounce sentence, and just in case at some point it matters, the Court will recall that the government filed an 851 information prior to trial.

THE COURT: I do.

MR. SHERMAN: I would ask the Court at this time -- and I will get you a copy of it in a moment -- to proceed with the procedure in Section 851 of Title 21, which has to take place before the pronouncement of sentence.

THE COURT: What section is it, Mr. Sherman; and please give me a copy of --

MR. SHERMAN: Title 21, Section 851, your Honor, and specifically, Subsection (b) about affirmation or denial of previous conviction.

THE COURT: Let me read the Section 851 to you, for the benefit of Mr. Okay and Mr. Forbes.

"(a), (1), No person who stands convicted of an offense under this part shall be sentenced to increased punishment by reason of one or more prior convictions, unless before trial, or before entry of a plea of guilty, the United States Attorney files an information with the Court and serves a copy of such information on the person or counsel for the person stating in writing the previous convictions to be relied upon. Upon a showing by the U.S. Attorney that facts regarding prior convictions could not with due diligence be obtained prior to trial or before entry of a plea of guilty, the court may postpone the trial or the taking of the plea of guilty for a reasonable period for the purpose of obtaining such facts. Clerical mistakes

in the information may be amended at any time prior to the pronouncement of sentence.

"(2), an information may not be filed under this section if the increased punishment which may be imposed is imprisonment for a term in excess of three years unless the person either waived or was afforded prosecution by indictment for the offense for which such increased punishment may be imposed.

"(b), if the United States attorney files an information under this section, the Court shall after conviction but before pronouncement of sentence, inquire of the person with respect to whom the information was filed whether he affirms or denies that he has been previously convicted as alleged in the information, and shall inform him that any challenge to a prior conviction which is not made before sentence is imposed may not thereafter be raised to attack the sentence."

MR. SHERMAN: In that regard I am handing up the Amended Information that was filed on November 6th, 2000, a copy of which was given to Mr. Schiano.

(There was a pause in the proceeding.)

THE COURT: What I'm doing, Mr. Okay, I was just reviewing the transcript to see if in his plea of guilty under oath your client acknowledged the prior felony conviction as a felon in possession.

It appears, however, he acknowledged the reckless endangerment conviction.

MR. SHERMAN: I think that's correct, your Honor, because it was the reckless endangerment that was set forth in the 922(q) indictment.

To the extent that there's a question -- although I think we may have discussed this before -- I do have a certificate of disposition from Kings County with regard to this conviction.

THE COURT: Let me read you the section, Mr. Okay, since I don't know if you brought your book with you.

It says, "Denial, written response, hearing. If a person denies any allegation of the information of prior conviction, or claims that any conviction alleged is invalid, he shall file a written response to the information. A copy of the response shall be served upon the United States Attorney. The Court shall hold a hearing to determine any issues raised by the response which would except the person from increased punishment. The failure of the United States Attorney to include in the information the complete criminal record of the person or any facts in addition to the convictions to be relied upon shall not constitute grounds for invalidating the notice given in the information required by subsection (a) (1) of this section. The hearing shall be before the Court without a jury and

either party may introduce evidence. Except as otherwise provided in paragraph 2 of this subsection, the United States Attorney shall have the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on any issue of fact. At the request of either party the Court shall enter findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Subdivision (2), "A person claiming that a conviction alleged and the information was obtained in violation of the Constitution of the United States shall set forth his claim, and a factual basis therefor, with particularity in his response to the information. The person shall have the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence on any issue of fact raised by the response. Any challenge to a prior conviction not raised by response to the information before an increased sentence is imposed in reliance thereon shall be waived unless good cause be shown for failure to make a timely challenge.

Subdivision (d), "If the person files no response to the information, or if the Court determines after hearing that the person is subject to increased punishment by reason of prior convictions, the Court shall proceed to impose sentence upon him as provided by this part."

Mr. Sherman, before we proceed, since this issue may not have been anticipated by Mr. Okay, what is the effect of the information?

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MR. SHERMAN: Well, first of all, your Honor, this is in fact what enables the Court to impose a life sentence in this case because it increases the penalty of the drug counts, and specifically Count 1.

In addition, with regard to whether or not it was anticipated, I would note, first of all, on the cover page of the presentence report it states in bold letters, right underneath the Count 1 description, that there was an amended Section 851 information filed with regard to that count. That is what I handed up to the Court.

I would also note that paragraph 54 on page 12 of the PSR describes the conviction that we're talking about; and as the Court has already determined from the defense, there was no objection to that being in the PSR or the accuracy of it.

THE COURT: I understand that. However, I do recognize that Mr. Okay came in this case late.

Mr. Okay, since it means -- since it's obviously significant to your client, Mr. Sherman is representing that he has the certificate of conviction. It would appear from my reading of the statute it would be the government's burden of proof that beyond a reasonable doubt the Dennis Forbes who stands before me now was in fact convicted of this crime. It would be Dennis Forbes' burden to prove any constitutional challenge; for example, ineffective

assistance of counsel.

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So I do want to give you a moment to talk to your client, since it is significant, and to tell me what your client wishes to do.

MR. OKAY: All right.

(There was a pause in the proceeding.)

MR. OKAY: Your Honor, I have made inquiry of my client, and he is ready, if the Court wants, to continue. He indicated he is the Dennis Forbes, and he was convicted in Kings County.

THE COURT: Let me explain something, Mr. Forbes, so you know. I think we may have explained this before with Mr. Schiano; but I am mindful that you went through Mr. Schiano, Mr. Wicks, represented yourself on a motion to withdraw, and then Mr. Okay, who has been good enough to accept assignment in this case.

If in fact you are the Dennis Forbes who was convicted of this crime, it ups the ante; in other words, it makes the guideline range life. Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: If you were not the Dennis Forbes, but for this conviction, if you weren't -- if you were not the person who was convicted of this crime, then under the guidelines under the law, the sentencing range I could give you is --

Mr. Lyons, 10 to life? 1 PROBATION OFFICER LYONS: I believe that is correct, 2 your Honor. 3 MR. SHERMAN: Your Honor, I think the guideline is 4 not changing. What's changing is the mandatory minimum. 5 Because of this conviction, his mandatory minimum is 20 to б life instead of 10; but his guideline maximum is still life. 7 THE COURT: So what you're saying to me, Mr. 8 Sherman, is it changes the statutory minimum. 9 10 MR. SHERMAN: Correct. THE COURT: Your quideline is still life. 11 would -- so it really in no way affects the sentence I could 12 give. 13 It only affects if after appeal MR. SHERMAN: No. 14 Mr. Forbes happens to be successful. We establish that the 15 851 information was valid; and therefore, if it ever becomes 16 relevant, there was a 20-year statutory minimum. 17 Do you understand that, Mr. Forbes? THE COURT: 18 MR. OKAY: Your Honor, if I can take a minute I can 19 explain it to him. If we could go back here and sit down? 20 THE COURT: Absolutely, Mr. Okay. 21 22 (There was a pause in the proceeding.) The Court notes that Mr. Okay has had 23 THE COURT: the opportunity to confer with Mr. Forbes. 24 As I indicated, Mr. Okay, while Mr. Sherman is 25

correct, notice was given on the presentence report as to the filing of the information, I am mindful that you stepped in at the last minute and certainly will accord you every courtesy in that record if your client wants to contest that issue. Does he want to contest it?

MR. OKAY: Your Honor, based on my discussion with him right now, I explained to him the penalties under the statute and the penalties under the guideline, how the guideline calculation that we have was arrived at, a level 43, I believe in the Court's finding, and criminal history category of III. This conviction in '87 is too old to affect his criminal history category. It's not going to affect that.

The only question is if he is the same Dennis Forbes and if the Dennis Forbes has the challenge to the plea in Kings County in '87, what that does is up the mandatory minimum for the sentence, that the least sentence you can get under the guidelines is 20 years. If he is not the Dennis Forbes and he has a constitutional challenge, that puts it at 10. If that's based on the trial and this Court's understanding of the guidelines, the guidelines won't allow us to reach the minimum. I think Mr. Forbes understands this.

I want to point out, a lot of lawyers don't understand a lot of this. I don't want to force this on Mr.

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Forbes now, but basically what I explained to him is it doesn't make any difference. The guideline calculations don't make any different. 43 --THE COURT: Is it 43 or 45? 4 MR. SHERMAN: I think the two points only come off 5 the drug case. 6 THE COURT: It's 45, right. 7 MR. OKAY: 43, 45, it's still life. 8 THE COURT: You're correct. 9 MR. OKAY: It's an academic conversation. And based 10 on the discussion, Mr. Forbes -- and I'll let Mr. Forbes 11 speak for himself -- he's not interested in contesting, and 12 he will admit that he is the same Dennis Forbes who was 13 convicted in Kings County in 1987. 14 THE COURT: Is that correct, Mr. Forbes? 15 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 16 THE COURT: Are you the same Dennis Forbes who was 17 in fact convicted on or about September 2nd, 1987, in Kings 18 County Supreme Court in Kings County, New York, of the Class 19 C felony of attempted sale of a controlled substance in the 20 third degree; are you the same person? 21 THE DEFENDANT: Can I ask you a question? 22 THE COURT: Yes. 23 THE DEFENDANT: Do you mean if I'm the same person 24 25 in the same frame of mind or --

THE COURT: No, you are the same person?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: The Court notes it has satisfied the information and we can proceed.

As I indicated you do have, Mr. Forbes, by my count, four prior convictions. We went through the resisting arrest, the reckless endangerment first, a felony conviction for which you received a sentence of 28 months to five years.

Finally, you've been convicted -- it appears you have three prior convictions. I may have misspoken and said four, but you have three prior convictions, the three I recited. So this makes the subject offense your fourth criminal conviction.

In any event, Mr. Forbes, as you know sentencing in this action is pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. As indicated, Mr. Okay has received a copy of the revised Presentence Investigation Report and reviewed it with you. Additionally, you've indicated that you've read the report yourself.

The Court has previously ruled on the five objections you made to the Presentence Investigation Report. The Court otherwise adopts the statements contained in the Presentence Investigation Report as its findings of fact.

Accordingly, the Court finds as to indictment

99-CR-6089, Count 1 and 3, as follows: Your base offense level is 38. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. Section 2D1(b)(1), there is a two-level increase because of your possession of a handgun. That raises your offense level to 40.

Pursuant to U.S.S.G. Section 3B1.1(a), there is a four-level increase since you were an organizer and leader who employed more than five individuals. That raises your offense level to 44.

There is an additional one-point enhancement because you employed a minor in your crime of conviction on Count No. 3 pursuant to the Guideline Section 2D1.2(a)(2), which raises your total offense level on Counts 1 and 3 of indictment 99-CR-6089 to 45.

As to the indictment to which you pled, 99-CR-6084, your base offense level is 20. There's a two-level enhancement pursuant to Guideline Section 2K2.1(b)(4) since the gun was stolen, which brings you to a 22.

There is a four-level enhancement pursuant to Guideline Section 2K2.1(b)(5) since you possessed a firearm during the time you were engaged in distributing cocaine, which raises it to a 26.

Your total offense level on the second indictment is 26; however, Counts 1 and 3 of the first indictment are grouped based on the amount of drugs involved. The guideline calculations are nine levels more serious than for

the plea of guilty to the felon in possession of a firearm charge. In accordance with Guideline Section 3D1.4(c), the offense level for Counts 1 and 3 becomes the total offense level, becomes controlling.

That means your total offense level is 45, your criminal history category is III, based on four total criminal history points.

So based on those calculations, Mr. Forbes, my options under the guidelines are as follows: Your imprisonment range is life for all counts of both indictments considered together. You're looking at supervised release on Counts 1 and 3 of Indictment 6089 of at least 10 years, three years on Indictment 6084. You are not eligible for probation. Your fine range on both indictments for all counts considered together is 25,000 to 4 million. There is no issue of restitution; and you must pay a \$100 special assessment for your conviction of each felony, which totals 300.

So, Mr. Forbes, those are my options.

Mr. Forbes, on deciding on an appropriate sentence, the Court has carefully considered all the facts and circumstances surrounding your conviction, as well as the objectives of sentencing, including punishment and deterrence.

Mr. Forbes, I will tell you to your face, I agree

with Mr. Sherman's statement of your conduct. You effected a lot of lives; not only the lives of people who bought your cocaine base and marijuana that you were responsible for putting on the street, but also the lives of the individuals that you utilized in your distribution network.

I went back and looked carefully at this entire case, and I found correspondence that you sent to me. And I specifically noted this. You sent me a letter that's dated April 12th of 2001.

"Honorable Judge Siragusa: In these documents that I am sending you, two of them are my oldest daughter asking you to have a heart as a just judge.

"There is a lot of things that are said about me to you by the officers; but if you based what they say as knowing me, then this means your mind is already set against me and my family.

"I can't change the outcome of my prior conviction.

If I could, I would; but I'm trying to change a lot of
things about my life. That's why I established a business
with my wife and work so my kids can see that working can
get you anything you want in life as well as being their
role model to my kids and family.

"I feel strongly that my conviction is based entirely on my prior conviction. That is why I'm going to jail, and with the help of the officers who did everything

to ensure that I'm behind bars, showed that there is no justice for -- I can't read the word -- maybe "African people. The officers have turned so many people against me it makes sense why the case went the way it did and my conviction.

"The other papers explain my case, the arrest procedure, along with my due process and constitutional violations that were the strength of my case getting dismissed, which never took place. You as the Judge, can you do something about it knowing that you have the power to make it right?"

Now, here's the letters you sent to me from your daughters. "Dear Sorrogusto, my name is Shanah Forbes, the oldest daughter from my dad, Dennis Anthony Forbes. I pray every day for my dad to come home to us. My dad loves us a lot and we love him unconditional. I miss playing with him. Now that I'm getting older I need him more for everything. Please help my dad so he can be with us again and we can have a happy family again. Thank you, Shanah Forbes."

"Dear Judge Siragusa, I love my dad. My dad's name is Dennis Anthony Forbes. My dad takes good care of me. We go to a lot of fun places like Disney World and Six Flags, etc. I miss my dad. He is not a bad person. He is a very good and a loving person to everyone. Please help my dad and make him come home. We miss him a lot. Thank you,

Shaquana Forbes."

THE COURT: Mr. Forbes, I don't know what you mean by your prior conviction led to your conviction. It didn't. I sat on the case. The evidence of your involvement in the conspiracy for which you were convicted was, frankly, overwhelming. The jury felt there was not proof -- at least some of them felt there was not proof beyond a reasonable doubt on the gun charge, which resulted in the hung jury.

I am flabbergasted that you write that you're a role model for your children. You have your children write letters to me. It's truly amazing to me, Mr. Forbes. It just puts the accent mark on something Mr. Sherman said. You have no remorse for what you've done.

I think, what if your kids got the drugs that you put on the street. Do you think about that? Your daughter says you take her to a lot of fun places like Disney World; and you know what pops into my mind? How did you pay for it? It seems that perhaps the money you got to pay for it came from your illegal means.

I don't have to base my sentence on that. All I have to base my sentence on is the person who appears before me and who has appeared before me many times; the person who used others, minors, to distribute cocaine base, crack, to people on the streets, obviously with the callous disregard for the effect the narcotics would have on the people who

use them and also on the lives of their loved ones.

It always amazes me, Mr. Forbes, how a person like you with kids whom I assume you love -- I don't question that for a moment; I believe you love your children -- how you can be oblivious to the fact that the narcotics you put on the street get into the hands of young people. I can only guess how you'd feel toward the person who might someday put drugs in the hands of your kids. I would assume as a father you would have no patience with them and your feelings might -- might and probably would -- run a lot stronger.

But the really amazing thing is you have shown absolutely no remorse -- none, zero, zilch -- for a crime that is the scourge of our contemporary society.

Pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, it is the judgment of this Court that you, Dennis Forbes, are hereby committed to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for the term of life on Counts 1 and 3 of Indictment 99-CR-6089. In addition, you are sentenced to a term of 120 months on Count 1 of Indictment 99-CR-6084. All such terms of imprisonment are to be served concurrently.

It is further ordered that you shall pay a fine of \$1,000 on Count 1, \$1,000 on Count 3, and \$1,000 on Indictment 99-CR-6084, for a total of \$3,000. Interest on the fine is waived. The fine payment shall be made from any

wages you may earn in prison in accordance with the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program.

It is further ordered that you should pay to the United States a special assessment of \$100 on Count 1, 100 on Count 3, and 100 on indictment 99-6084, for a total of \$300.

Upon release from the Bureau of Prisons, if that ever happens, on Count 6084, you would be placed on supervised release for a period of three years. Within 72 hours of your release from the Bureau of Prisons you shall report in person to the probation office in the district to which you are released.

I want to explain something. If the conviction stands up on the first indictment, that is the gun, and for some reason an appellate court may reverse the drug conviction, your conviction on Indictment No. 6084 will still stand. In that event, though unlikely, hopefully, as it will be, you shall be placed on supervised release for three years.

While on supervised release you shall not commit another federal, state, or local crime. You shall also complied with the standard conditions that have been adopted by this Court, as well as the following special conditions:

You shall participate in a drug and alcohol treatment program under a co-payment plan, which may include

urine testing, as approved by the probation officer. If treatment is recommended, you are not to leave your treatment unless approved by both your counselor and the U.S. Probation officer.

You shall submit to a search of your person, property, vehicle, and personal residence, or other others under your control, conducted as determined by the probation officer.

I instruct you pursuant to Rule 32(c)(5) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, you are advised of your right to appeal the sentence imposed as to both indictment number 99-6089 and 99-6084. If you are unable to pay the cost of an appeal you may apply for leave to appeal as a poor person.

That is the sentence of this Court.

Anything else, counsel?

MR. SHERMAN: Your Honor, in light of we're now having reached sentencing, pursuant to the representation I made at the time of Mr. Forbes' plea, I will move to dismiss Count 2 of 99-CR-6089, which is the 924(c) count.

THE COURT: That count is dismissed.

MR. OKAY: Thank you very much, Judge.

(The court was adjourned.)

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CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript of the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter. Francis J LeoGrande Date Official Court Reporter